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Abstract 
Research has provided compelling evidence that employee referrals result in 
positive outcomes for organizations and job seekers, but it has been limited 
on how organizations can increase the likelihood of obtaining employee re-
ferrals. Using the theoretical lens of social exchange theory and tenets from 
expectancy theory, we tested two common assumptions of most employers: 
A referral bonus motivates employees to refer, and higher bonus amounts 
incite greater likelihood of referring. We theoretically developed and tested 
a model integrating the effects of perceived risk in referring and affective 
commitment and their interactions with the referral bonus to better explain 
the likelihood of referring. Results largely supported our predictions. Re-
ferral bonus presence, referral bonus amount, and affective commitment 
digitalcommons.unl.edu
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positively related to likelihood of referring, while perceived risk in referring 
negatively related to likelihood of referring. The findings also suggest that 
larger referral bonuses can help offset perceived risk in referring and low 
affective commitment levels. We contribute to the literature by developing 
theory, expanding the scope of the current referral literature, and offering 
a quantitative examination of previously theorized variables in the referring 
process. We conclude with suggestions to practicing managers on ways to 
improve the motivating potential of their employee referral programs. 
Keywords: affective commitment, employee referrals, recruitment, referral 
bonus characteristics, risk in referring  
1  Introduction 
Recruiting the right people for the job has been a pillar of cultivating 
and maintaining organizational success. However, organizations’ re-
cruitment activities are not always fruitful because they often lead to 
poor-fitting hires who voluntarily quit or are involuntarily terminated 
due to poor performance (Arthur, Bell, Villado, & Doverspike, 2006; 
Kristof-Brown, Zimmerman, & Johnson, 2005; Schneider, 1987). Be-
cause the cost of recruiting and training new employees is estimated 
to be 38% of the departing employee’s annual wage (Morey, 2007), 
deficiencies in the recruiting process can be quite expensive. Recruit-
ment costs, while varying across industries and jobs, can accumu-
late in general through advertising, job fair expenses, and third-party 
agency or recruiter fees, as well as salary and benefits for the recruit-
ment team. An organization, therefore, must choose wisely when de-
ciding on its menu of recruitment sources and would be best served 
by finding a recruiting method that both minimizes costs and results 
in sound hires that fit well in the organizational environment. 
A popular approach to resolving this dilemma has been the use of 
employee referral programs, which are designed to encourage current 
employees (referrers) to match open positions with qualified candi-
dates in their social network (referred candidates/hires). Employee re-
ferrals are attractive because many of the costs associated with formal 
recruitment practices can be avoided (e.g., advertising and third-party 
recruiter fees). In addition, because the labor market encompasses 
much uncertainty (Caggiano, Castelnuovo, & Groshenny, 2014; Rees, 
1966; Storesletten, Telmer, & Yaron, 2001), organizations can leverage 
their employees’ social networks to reduce informational asymmetries 
in the hiring process and facilitate better matches. 
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Because no organization or individual can acquire complete in-
formation in the job search process (Sattinger, 1995; Stigler, 1962), 
misfit hires may occur (Connelly, Certo, Ireland, & Reutzel, 2011), and 
those individuals often experience discomfort, unpleasant emotional 
reactions, and incompatibility with the organization (Billsberry & De 
Cooman, 2010; Follmer, Talbot, Kristof-Brown, Astrove, & Billsberry, 
in press). When hiring, the organization assumes risk about a candi-
date’s potential behaviors and attitudes, while the candidate assumes 
risk about the actual nature of the job and the organization. Referrers 
can mitigate the uncertainty that underlies these risks. Unlike more 
traditional recruitment mediums (e.g., online job advertisements), re-
ferrals from employees within the organization can provide poten-
tial candidates with direct knowledge about the organization’s be-
havioral and cultural expectations. This information acts similarly to 
realistic job previews (Wanous, 1980), allowing referred hires to en-
ter into employment with more complete information thanks to the 
referrer’s insights. 
Beyond this information advantage, employee referral programs 
may attract candidates with attributes similar to those of the referrer 
(Bayer, Ross, & Topa, 2008; Rees, 1966; Taylor & Schmidt, 1983; Ull-
man, 1966; Williams, Labig, & Stone, 1993), which can act as a pre-
liminary signal to the organization about the applicant’s quality. An 
individual’s social network tends to be homogeneous regarding be-
havioral and intrapersonal characteristics (McPherson, Smith- Lovin, 
& Cook, 2001). Intuitively, this similarity is beneficial in that the re-
ferrer has previously passed through the hiring stages and secured a 
position at the organization, suggesting that the referred candidate, 
who is part of the referrer’s social network, may be more likely to gain 
employment with the organization. Such similarity also makes it eas-
ier for organizations to identify candidates who are compatible with 
its value system, reinforcing person–organization fit (Kristof, 1996). 
Employee referrals also increase the likelihood of a successful hire 
(Brown, Setren, & Topa, 2012; Fernandez, Castilla, & Moore, 2000; 
Pieper, 2015), decreasing wasted resources during the hiring process. 
The literature provides consistent evidence that organizations bene-
fit from referred hires’ greater retention rates and higher performance 
than nonreferred hires (Barber, 1998; Breaugh & Starke, 2000; Brown 
et al., 2012; Burks, Cowgill, Hoffman, & Housman, 2015; Castilla, 2005; 
Pieper, 2015; Rynes, 1991; Rynes & Cable, 2003; Rynes, Heneman, & 
Schwab, 1980; Schwab, 1982; Taylor & Collins, 2000; Zottoli & Wanous, 
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2000). Referred candidates also benefit; they are more likely than non-
referred candidates to receive a job offer (Fernandez et al., 2000; Hol-
zer, 1988; Van Hoye, van Hooft, & Lievens, 2009) and be hired (Brown 
et al., 2012). Additionally, a referral from incumbent employees is a 
relatively low-cost and efficient job-seeking mechanism to help job 
seekers locate a position (Marsden & Gorman, 2001). Given this ev-
idence, it would thus seem natural that organizations and job seek-
ers would prefer to use employee referrals if given the opportunity. 
However, the key piece—the referrer—must be motivated to refer for 
these aforementioned benefits to occur. Thus, an important and un-
answered question arises concerning how organizations can motivate 
employees to refer. 
Recent literature has given some theoretical attention to psycho-
logical factors that may affect an employee’s likelihood of referring. 
Positive attitudes toward the employer, such as affective commitment 
(Bloemer, 2010) and job satisfaction (Van Hoye, 2013), have been pro-
posed as possibly influencing the likelihood an employee would rec-
ommend the employer to others (Shinnar, Young, & Meana, 2004). An 
employee also may recommend an employer out of a prosocial motive 
to help a friend find a respectable job or to help the employer find a 
good employee (Van Hoye, 2013). While these studies have been in-
fluential, little empirical support has been provided to support their 
claims, and little attention has been given to the actions organizations 
take to motivate their employees to refer and the efficacy of such ac-
tions in affecting employees’ motivations to refer. 
The most common and popular action taken by an organization 
to entice employees to refer is offering employee referral bonuses for 
successful hires. A 2014 WorldatWork report indicated that 63% of 713 
surveyed firms had employee referral bonuses in place, ranging from 
$250 for entry-level positions to $5,000 or more for executive-level 
positions (WorldatWork, 2014). This percentage has remained steady 
over the past decade, as the Society of Human Resource Manage-
ment’s (SHRM) survey in 2001 reported a similar figure (SHRM, 2001). 
Referral bonuses are based on the assumption that offering a finan-
cial incentive will incite behavior. However, the efficacy of the refer-
ral bonus in increasing the likelihood of referring remains to be fully 
understood; prior work has tended to narrowly conceptualize the re-
ferral bonus construct and has rarely emphasized the exigencies that 
may be integral to its effectiveness. 
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In response, we leverage social exchange theory (SET; P. M. Blau, 
1964) and expectancy theory (Vroom, 1964) to explore a more nu-
anced explanation of the motivating potential of the referral bo-
nus. We argue that referral bonuses should motivate employees to 
refer because they serve as a desired reward in exchange for a de-
sired behavior. We first expand the approach to referral bonus con-
ceptualization and measurement—one that commonly examines re-
ferral bonus presence (does offering a referral bonus matter?)—to 
also include the referral bonus amount (do larger referral bonus 
amounts increase behavior?). Next, we empirically examine the ex-
tent to which the referral bonus affects two factors we propose as 
relevant to motivating employees to refer: (a) the influence of per-
ceived risk in referring on the likelihood of referring and whether the 
referral bonus offsets the proposed negative effect of risk; and (b) 
the role of affective commitment in influencing the likelihood of re-
ferring and whether the referral bonus reduces the proposed posi-
tive effects of affective commitment on likelihood of referring. Fig-
ure 1 presents the relationships tested here. 
We seek to address two critiques of the employee referral liter-
ature: (a) it has primarily concentrated on outcomes of referring for 
referred hires and organizations, but “has left organizations with few 
clues about how to achieve [employee referrals]” (Van Hoye, 2013, p. 
452); and (b) it has given little attention to the referrers (Pieper, 2015; 
Pieper, Trevor, Weller, & Duchon, in press). Our expanded focus on the 
characteristics of the referral bonus and how it interacts with two in-
ternal motives for referring (perceived risk in referring and affective 
commitment) integrates and extends existing theories on employee 
referrals (e.g., Bloemer, 2010; Shinnar et al., 2004; Van Hoye, 2013). 
For example, our study is the first to theoretically develop and em-
pirically test the relationship between perceived risk in referring and 
likelihood of referring, despite the theoretically reasoned relationship 
(e.g., Linnehan & Blau, 2003; Marin, 2012; Rees, 1966). Our study fi-
nally offers valuable insight on the practical implications of offering 
a referral bonus and increasing its amount, managing perceived risk, 
and understanding the role of affective commitment to improve em-
ployee referral programs. 
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2  Theory and Hypotheses 
2.1  Motivating employee referrals through referral bonuses 
To motivate employee referrals, many organizations offer their em-
ployees monetary rewards in exchange for successful referrals. Previ-
ous scholarly work on employee referrals has given some attention to 
the influence of monetary incentives in the referring process. For in-
stance, Shinnar et al. (2004) argued in their Employee Recommenders’ 
Motivation and Outcomes (ERMO) model that organizational incen-
tives can compel employees to refer. However, they primarily investi-
gated and measured how providing an employee referral affects a re-
ferrer’s normative commitment and job satisfaction levels, rather than 
the presence or characteristics of the referral bonus. In the research 
giving greater attention to the referral bonus, the construct is often 
narrowly conceptualized and operationalized by scholars considering 
only its presence or lack thereof. For instance, Van Hoye (2013) con-
sidered the relationship between an employee’s perception that a re-
ward is offered for employee referrals in one’s organization and the 
extent of positive (or negative) information conveyed to a candidate. 
Van Hoye (2013) also compared two organizations—one that did not 
offer a referral bonus and one that did—and found that, within the 
previous six months, employees in the organization offering a referral 
bonus conveyed more positive and less negative information about 
their employer to potential hires, compared to employees in the or-
ganization without a referral bonus. Although this finding suggests 
that incentives matter, one cannot rule out alternative explanations 
(e.g., differential employment relations in one firm versus the other). 
Integrating social exchange theory (SET) with aspects of expec-
tancy theory, we explain the ways in which a referral bonus offered 
by an organization affects employees’ referring likelihood. Social ex-
changes occur in situations of mutual dependence, in which individ-
uals depend upon each other for the exchange of valued resources 
(tangible or intangible; Homans, 1961). Molm, Collett, and Schae-
fer (2007) state that there are different forms of social exchange that 
vary in reciprocity. These include direct negotiated exchange (a dy-
adic exchange characterized by expected and known reciprocity); di-
rect reciprocal exchange (in which individuals perform acts that ben-
efit each other but are unable to predict reciprocity); and generalized 
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exchanges (an exchange involving more than two actors, in which the 
one who receives the benefit does not reciprocate to the giver but to 
another in the social circle). We theorize that the presence of a refer-
ral bonus represents the first distinction, a direct negotiated exchange 
motivator. As such, a referral bonus is intuitive, in that to create de-
sired employee behavior, organizations must provide an incentive. 
Expectancy theory (Vroom, 1964), one of the more common theo-
retical frameworks for understanding the motivational consequences 
of pay (Gerhart & Rynes, 2003), is perhaps most applicable in this case. 
In this framework, we can conceptualize having referred a hired can-
didate as “successful performance.” In exchange for this performance, 
organizations can give a referral bonus that is known and expected 
by employees. Based on expectancy theory, employees will be moti-
vated to perform (engage in referring candidates) as a multiplicative 
function of three beliefs: valence (the perceived value of the reward), 
expectancy (the perceived likelihood that action or effort will lead 
to desired performance), and instrumentality (the belief that perfor-
mance will be rewarded). Increasing any of these three beliefs will cre-
ate greater motivation to perform (Vroom, 1964). The central premise 
is clear: Individuals will consider the value of the reward, how effort 
contributes to performance, and how that performance later trans-
lates to desirable outcomes (Lawler & Suttle, 1973). In this system, re-
ferral bonuses act as compensation in exchange for the employee’s 
effort to locate an appropriate individual in his or her social network 
and communicate job information; individuals will perform to earn 
the reward (Kepes, Delery, & Gupta, 2009). 
While we believe that a referral bonus mainly operates as a direct 
negotiated exchange, its presence, and/or the priming of the value 
of employee referrals to the organization in general, may also signal 
other direct reciprocal and generalized exchange opportunities as a 
part of the larger social exchange between employee and employer. 
According to SET, actors engage in exchanges over time in an effort to 
be mutually beneficial (Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005). Actors perform 
reciprocal exchanges with one another when the exact returns for 
those exchanges are not necessarily explicitly stated (Molm, Takahashi, 
& Peterson, 2000) but perhaps generally expected at some future time 
(Cook & Rice, 2003). SET has been used extensively to explain why 
employees may perform actions beyond those that are contractually 
or formally required by the nature of the job (e.g., Bateman & Organ, 
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1983; Settoon, Bennet, & Liden, 1996). We believe that the presence 
of the bonus may send signals to employees (e.g., that their organi-
zation is fair and considerate of their well-being, that the organiza-
tion values referrals) that incite them to engage in organizational cit-
izenship behaviors, such as referring. Because many diverse resources 
may be exchanged in this process, including “love, status, informa-
tion, money, goods, and services” (Foa, 1971, p. 346), referrers may 
perceive other possible future exchange opportunities for their will-
ingness to refer, such as praise and appreciation. Given its motivating 
effect as a direct reward for desired behavior and its signaling of po-
tential future exchanges, a referral bonus should increase the likeli-
hood that employees will refer. We propose the following: 
Hypothesis 1: The presence of a referral bonus will positively re-
late to likelihood of referring. 
In addition, not all referral bonuses are equal; they range in value. 
Thus, a compelling empirical question is whether larger referral bo-
nuses relate to a greater likelihood that individuals will refer. Accord-
ing to expectancy theory (Lawler, 1971; Vroom, 1964), increasing the 
referral bonus amount should increase the valence of the referral bo-
nus. Because money is a valued resource in society for obtaining de-
sired rewards or status (Zhou, Vohs, & Baumeister, 2009), larger re-
ferral bonuses should entice greater motivation to perform. This is 
aligned with research that has demonstrated a general relationship 
between valence and performance (Heneman & Schwab, 1972; Van 
Eerde & Thierry, 1996). For example, Kirchler, Fehr, and Evans (1996) 
provided evidence that when employers offer more money than nec-
essary for the completion of a job or task, workers will feel more ob-
ligated to reciprocate. Similarly, based on SET, it could be argued that 
higher referral bonuses may act as a stronger signal to incumbent em-
ployees that their reciprocity is valued. With more money, one can ac-
quire more goods and services; thus, larger bonuses should be more 
valued in the social exchange process, further encouraging one to en-
gage in the exchange. We hypothesize the following: 
Hypothesis 2: Referral bonus amount will positively relate to 
likelihood of referring. 
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2.2  Referral bonus amount, perceived risk in referring, and re-
ferring behavior 
2.2.1  Main effect of perceived risk in referring 
We contend that there is a generalized risk inherent in the so-
cial exchange process of referring and argue that perceptions of risk 
negatively impact whether one will refer. Although risk has been dis-
cussed briefly in the employee referral literature as a potential con-
straint (Montgomery, 1991; Yakubovich & Lup, 2006), it has been ex-
amined qualitatively only in interviews probing the impetus to refer 
(e.g., Marin, 2012; Smith, 2005). Thus, the construct needs further the-
oretical development and empirical investigation. We characterize per-
ceived risk in referring as a general concept because our interest is in 
all possible effects of perceptions of risk, or costs, in referring (e.g., 
risk to one’s status or reputation in the organization, repercussions to 
the relationship with the referral hire, or social risk with other employ-
ees who may not approve of the referral hire). Because working in an 
organization is rarely an endeavor in which parties separate quickly, 
employees will be concerned not only with short-term gains (i.e., re-
ferral bonus) but also with long-term impacts on subsequent social 
exchange opportunities within the organization. Individuals must con-
sider both their immediate economic well-being and their continued 
economic and social stability (Lin, 2001; Smith, 2005). 
Perceived risk in referring may arise from a combination of pos-
sible exchange situations. First, and most obviously, if the referred 
hire fails to perform the job as expected, the referrer may be dam-
aged through “guilt by association,” facing criticism, either overtly 
or implicitly, for his or her inability to properly prescreen the appli-
cant for person–job fit. Referrers, theoretically, are valuable for their 
ability to prescreen candidates; and, as noted earlier, misfits arise 
when incomplete information is disseminated to both parties (Con-
nelly et al., 2011). Thus, it is partially the referrer’s task to provide 
as much information as possible (Breaugh & Mann, 1984; G. Blau, 
1990; Vecchio, 1995) and only attempt to refer applicants who they 
believe will perform well in the job (Kirnan, Farley, & Geisinger, 1989; 
Ullman, 1966). Employees may be leery of referring if they perceive 
risk to their status or reputation from their inability to perform these 
actions successfully. 
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The referrer also theoretically prescreens the potential candidate’s 
fit within the cultural fabric of the firm and therefore may be penalized 
by coworkers if the referred hire does not fit with the organization’s 
culture and social environment, despite possibly performing well. If 
the referred candidate is hired, the referrer may serve as an important 
agent for socializing the new hire into the organization (Fernandez et 
al., 2000). If referrers fail to perform these roles successfully, the or-
ganizational culture may be threatened with a misfit. New hires who 
fail to mirror the values of the organization are less likely to be ac-
cepted by its employees (Feldman, 1981), which can negatively influ-
ence cohesiveness in the workplace. Thus, a poor-fitting referred hire 
may strain the referrer’s organizational relationships, putting subse-
quent social exchanges at risk. 
Additional perceived risk may stem from the referrer–referral re-
lationship. For instance, referred candidates may feel disappointed if, 
after being convinced to apply for a position, they are not eventually 
hired (Marin, 2012). If not hired, the referred candidate may give in-
sufficient recognition or even fail to recognize the rendered social ex-
change on behalf of the referrer (i.e., the referring behavior). The re-
ferred candidate may also relay misinformation about the referrer’s 
abilities to others, affecting the referrer’s reputation (Lin, 2001) and 
the potential to engage in subsequent social exchanges. If the re-
ferred candidate is hired, the boundaries between work and nonwork 
may blur and create conflicting demands, which may negatively in-
fluence the relationship between referrer and referred hire (Wilson et 
al., 2004). The organization can suffer if the dyad’s relationship turns 
sour (Labianca & Brass, 2006). Therefore, to the degree that employ-
ees perceive referring as generally risky, they will be less likely to refer. 
Hypothesis 3: Perceived risk in referring will negatively relate to 
likelihood of referring. 
2.2.2  Perceived risk in referring by referral bonus interaction 
While risk in referring has been discussed in the literature as a 
mechanism that may influence referring behavior (e.g., Rees, 1966; Sa-
loner, 1985), its theoretical coupling with the referral bonus has been 
minimal. Certain employees may incur risk in favor of the referral bo-
nus and vice versa. For example, Linnehan and Blau (2003) proposed 
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that the ease with which employees can move within the labor market 
may lead them to favor the referral bonus over the risk because their 
long-term economic stability is not at risk from the damage of one 
bad referral. Other employees may be more hesitant, as was evident 
in interviews conducted by Marin (2012). Specifically, Marin (2012) 
found that information holders often would not communicate job 
openings to job seekers for fear of negative repercussions of a bad 
referral, despite a $500 referral bonus for successful hires who stayed 
on the job for six months. Therefore, it seems evident that outcomes 
of referring include not only the desirable referral bonus but also per-
ceptions of risk in referring. 
We argue that when employees perceive risk in referring, they will 
avoid referring unless the potential reward is large enough to com-
pensate for such risk. To better understand this interplay, we supple-
ment our core theoretical frameworks, SET and expectancy theory, 
with some predictions from prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979). From this perspective, individuals construct a “representation 
of the acts, contingencies, and outcomes that are relevant to the de-
cision” and assess “the value of each prospect” to make the appro-
priate decision (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992, p. 299). A key assump-
tion is that losses loom greater than gains (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979), meaning that because people are loss averse they generally 
consider the displeasure of losses to be greater than the pleasure of 
equal gains (Tversky & Kahneman, 1991). This complements a key as-
sumption of SET: that actors “behave in ways which tend to increase 
outcomes they value positively and to decrease outcomes they value 
negatively” (Molm, 1994, p. 164). 
In short, employees assess the gains and losses from each given 
outcome of the referring process and the probability that those out-
comes will materialize, then decide whether to engage in referring 
behavior. In this process, they likely will consider their history of re-
sources exchanged in the organization (e.g., informational expertise, 
status achieved, love/liking from others) as an asset they have psy-
chological ownership over. Because individuals tend to ascribe a high 
value to assets they already have (Morewedge & Giblin, 2015), they 
should consciously avoid the opportunity for bad events (e.g., dam-
age from a poor referral) to threaten those assets, especially as bad 
events tend to be more impactful than comparable good events (Bau-
meister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001). 
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Moreover, people typically avoid risk taking unless the potential 
reward is large enough to compensate for such risk (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979). The referral bonus amount therefore needed to get 
employees to engage in the social exchange of referring depends on 
their perceptions of the risks involved. As we argued earlier, expec-
tancy theory (Lawler, 1971; Vroom, 1964) stipulates that increasing 
the referral bonus amount should increase the valence of the reward, 
which should lead to performance (engaging in referring) because of 
money’s inherent value (Mitchell & Mickel, 1999; Zhou et al., 2009). 
Increasing the amount of the referral bonus may reduce the salience 
of perceived risk in comparison to the attractive monetary incen-
tive. Research has documented similar relationships in studies that 
describe how incentive structure can influence risk-taking behaviors 
(Ross, 2004; Wright, Kroll, Krug, & Pettus, 2007). Thus, we expect the 
negative relationship between perceived risk and likelihood of re-
ferring to weaken such that when larger referral bonus amounts are 
awarded, individuals will be more likely to choose to refer than avoid 
the risk. 
Hypothesis 4: Referral bonus amount will moderate the per-
ceived risk-in-referring effect on likelihood of referring. That is, 
when the referral bonus amount is large, the negative effect of 
perceived risk in referring will be weaker. 
2.3  Referral bonus amount, affective commitment, and refer-
ring behavior 
2.3.1  Main effect of affective commitment 
We propose that another force influencing likelihood of referring is 
affective commitment, defined as “the strength of an individual’s iden-
tification with and involvement in a particular organization” (Porter, 
Steers, Mowday, & Boulian, 1974, p. 604). Individuals with a high level 
of affective commitment personally identify with the values and goals 
of the organization and are less driven by factors such as “side bets” 
or moral obligation to duty (H. S. Becker, 1960; Meyer & Allen, 1991; 
Wiener, 1982). Rather, affective commitment is caused by “a high de-
gree of emotional identification” (Carmeli, 2005, p. 447), in which indi-
viduals feel attached to an organization (Meyer & Allen, 1991; Meyer 
& Herscovitch, 2001; Vandenberghe, Bentein, & Stinglhamber, 2004). 
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In previous research, this attachment has been linked primarily with 
lower turnover or turnover intention (Arnold & Feldman, 1982; Blue-
dorn, 1982; Cohen, 1993; Koch & Steers, 1978; Meyer, Stanley, Hersco-
vitch, & Topolnytsky, 2002; Werbel & Gould, 1984) and other perfor-
mance-related behaviors (Lee, 1971; Meyer et al., 2002; Steers, 1977). 
When levels of commitment are high, employees are more confident 
that their social exchanges will be reciprocated by the organization, 
either formally or informally (Wayne, Shore, & Liden, 1997). Thus, re-
search suggests that employees with higher levels of affective com-
mitment are more likely to enter exchange relationships with their 
employers (Tsui, Pearce, Porter, & Tripoli, 1997). We extend this body 
of research by suggesting that individuals more affectively commit-
ted to their organization are more likely to engage in the exchange 
of making a referral. 
G. J. Blau (1986) describes the basic principle underlying social ex-
change as the following: The one who supplies a reward automati-
cally obligates the other to repay. If the resources offered by the other 
person are of value to an individual, that individual will likely supply 
more services to incentivize the other to increase their exchanges to 
avoid becoming indebted. Those with higher affective commitment 
likely place greater value on the resources of their organization, and 
thus may be more likely to provide services to indebt the organiza-
tion to future exchanges. Thus, those with higher affective commit-
ment may be more likely to refer. 
Additionally, individuals more affectively committed see the orga-
nization as congruent with their own values and goals, causing attrac-
tion. Given this alignment, employees may feel an obligation to ex-
ert effort beyond what other individuals may feel is warranted (Meyer 
& Allen, 1991). When employees have this alignment, they find their 
jobs more fulfilling (Van Scotter, 2000) and may be more inclined to 
help ensure the continued success of the organization. We contend 
that this desire to maintain such elevated levels of emotional identi-
fication will be seen in individuals who are more apt to actively refer 
potential applicants for job openings, not only because they are con-
cerned about their own self-interest in regard to the organization’s 
continued operation, but also because they recognize the value that 
the organization provides. 
Hypothesis 5: Affective commitment will positively relate to 
likelihood of referring. 
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2.3.2  Affective commitment by referral bonus amount interaction 
Finally, we discuss how referral bonuses are more motivating at low 
rather than high levels of affective commitment. First, we argue that 
the personal gain of the monetary referral bonus can compensate for, 
or offset, the nonmotivating effect of low affective commitment levels. 
The notion of a compensatory effect has been applied across many 
research domains (e.g., employee knowledge sharing in Chen, 2011; 
entrepreneurial resource acquisition in Zhang, Soh, & Wong, 2010). 
An implicit assumption of the norm of reciprocity is that each party 
values the resources exchanged and the benefits for each are equal 
(Gouldner, 1960). In the case of referring, this would mean that em-
ployees will refer when they value the exchanged resources (e.g., mon-
etary value of the referral bonus or future exchange opportunities). In 
line with our earlier argument, employees with lower affective com-
mitment will be less likely to enter exchange relationships with their 
employer because they place less value on the employer’s resources 
and thus are less likely to provide services to indebt the employer to 
reciprocate. Employees with lower affective commitment will be less 
likely to refer because they place lower value on the potential for fu-
ture exchange opportunities with the organization; therefore, they will 
need to be incentivized to refer. Because referral bonuses are valued 
for their monetary nature, we argue that they will compensate for the 
effect of low commitment and motivate such individuals to enter the 
social exchange with the employer. This is like Chen’s (2011) finding 
that employees who felt in conflict with their colleagues were more 
willing to engage in knowledge sharing in their firm when they were 
offered a high monetary reward for doing so. That is, the monetary 
bonus is the primary compensation for the employee with a low level 
of affective commitment. 
For individuals higher in affective commitment, we argue that the 
referral bonuses will be less meaningful and, thus, motivating to these 
individuals. More specifically, and tying to expectancy theory, consider 
the reward for referring as composed of two parts: (a) the actual mon-
etary bonus and (b) a signal of future reciprocal behaviors to be paid 
by the organization. Unlike individuals who have low affective com-
mitment, those with higher affective commitment likely place a higher 
valence on the potential for future social exchange opportunities than 
the immediate gain of the monetary award. In addition, research has 
demonstrated that direct reciprocal exchanges (where reciprocation 
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is unknown) provide greater opportunities than direct negotiated ex-
changes (where reciprocation is negotiated and known) for exchange 
partners to demonstrate their trustworthiness in the future (Molm et 
al., 2000). Given this finding, the offer of a referral bonus may be less 
influential to an employee’s motivation to perform goodwill behav-
iors and demonstrate trustworthiness. Therefore, those with high lev-
els of affective commitment to their organizations likely choose to re-
fer as a means to indebt the organization to the more valuable future 
reciprocity opportunity. In turn, the referral bonus effect is not as im-
pactful for individuals higher in affective commitment. In summary, 
we hypothesize the following: 
Hypothesis 6: Referral bonus amount will moderate the affec-
tive commitment effect on likelihood of referring. That is, larger 
referral bonus amounts will have a stronger effect for employees 
with lower levels of affective commitment than employees with 
higher levels of affective commitment. 
3  Methods 
3.1  Sample and procedure 
We recruited full-time professionals who were working and residing in 
the United States, had a bachelor’s degree in a business-related field, 
were at least 19 years old, and were not self-employed or contract 
workers. Such participant qualifications enhanced the external validity 
of our findings. Participants were recruited from Qualtrics’ (www.qual-
trics.com) panel sample to participate in a web-based survey. Recent 
organizational research has used such a sampling strategy as a reli-
able data source (e.g., Courtright, Gardner, Smith, McCormick, & Col-
bert, 2015; DeCelles, DeRue, Margolis, & Ceranic, 2012; Long, Bend-
ersky, & Morrill, 2011), which helps minimize concerns about external 
validity (Aguinis & Lawal, 2012). As detailed below, we took several 
conservative precautions to preserve the internal and external validity 
of these data. Participants earned an equivalent of $5 in points that 
they could accumulate and redeem for rewards.   
Within the survey, participants first responded to the following 
scenario: “Your company is searching for someone to fill a job similar 
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to your own. Do you know someone qualified for this job?” An im-
plicit assumption in our research study design is that all employees 
of an organization know someone they can refer. However, evidence 
from qualitative studies, such as Marin (2012), suggest that not all em-
ployees may readily know someone to refer to a given position. We 
included in this study’s sample only those who responded yes to this 
question. The vignette enhances the realism of the study because it 
personally immerses individuals into their work situation (Aguinis & 
Bradley, 2014). They were next asked to provide the first name of the 
individual they knew to further increase the study’s realistic nature. 
They then read and responded to one of seven randomly assigned 
scenarios that varied by referral bonus characteristics. The no-refer-
ral-bonus scenario stated, “Your company is searching for someone 
to fill a job similar to your own. How likely are you to refer [name of 
person]?” The remaining six scenarios varied by referral bonus amount 
and a tenure benchmark for the referred new hire. The tenure bench-
mark was considered as a control variable because prior research has 
suggested a possible relationship between tenure benchmarks and 
likelihood of referring (Pieper, 2015), and because organizations of-
ten couple the referral bonus with a tenure benchmark (SHRM, 2001; 
WorldatWork, 2014). The scenario stated: 
Your company is searching for someone to fill a job similar to 
your own and is offering a referral bonus to employees who 
refer someone to this position. If your referral is hired, [and 
remains employed for at least 6 months], you will be awarded 
a lump-sum referral bonus of [$500, $1,500, $3,500]. How likely 
are you to refer [name of person]? 
After responding to the scenario, participants then responded, 
with their current employer in mind, to questions about perceived risk 
in referring, affective commitment, demographics, and other measures 
included as potential covariates. 
Based on “best practice” recommendations by several scholars 
who research the integrity of data from such crowdsourcing platforms 
as Qualtrics (e.g., Chandler & Paolacci, 2017; Keith, Tay, & Harms, 
2017), we carefully designed our study to address as many concerns 
about this sampling method as possible (such as participant impos-
ters and careless or low-effort responding) to ensure the integrity of 
P ieper  et  al .  in  Human Resource  Management  (2017 )       17
our data. First, to minimize participant imposters, potential partic-
ipants answered a set of qualifying questions about their employ-
ment status, country of residence and working location, age, and ed-
ucation before being invited to participate in the study. To qualify 
for participation in our study, they had to pass all the inclusion crite-
ria questions. Furthermore, we set the survey up so that individuals 
could not retake the qualifying questions more than once to “guess” 
what the correct qualifying answers were (i.e., Qualtrics’ “Prevent Bal-
lot Box Stuffing” option). Second, we incorporated an attention-fil-
tering question (“This is an attention filter. Please select ‘very impor-
tant’ for this statement.”) to screen for careless or insufficient-effort 
responding, which is a serious issue for sampling in general because 
it results in error variance (Huang, Bowling, Liu, & Li, 2015; Meade & 
Craig, 2012). Participants failing the attention-filtering question were 
directed out of the survey by Qualtrics and did not receive payment. 
A total of 227 participants met our inclusion criteria and passed the 
attention-filtering question. We further excluded 41 participants who 
failed a manipulation check that we included after our focal referring 
questions and before the demographic questions. Participants were in-
structed to select the referral bonus amount provided in the scenario 
they read earlier (“There was no bonus,” “$500,” “$1,500,” “$3,500,” or 
“Do not remember”). Importantly, the results were similar when we in-
cluded the excluded participants’ data, except that the results for the 
bonus characteristics were slightly weaker. Finally, we took one more 
approach to screening out low-effort responders by following the ap-
proach of Huang, Curran, Keeney, Poposki, and DeShon (2012), which 
entails removing participants who took less than 2 seconds to respond 
per item. This guideline translates to 86 seconds for our study, and all 
the remaining participants took longer than 86 seconds to complete 
the survey (Mean = 9 minutes; Median = 6 minutes); thus, no further 
participants were excluded. The final sample number was 186. 
3.2  Measures 
3.2.1  Referring behavior 
We assessed their likelihood of referring the person they knew on 
a 5- point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (“extremely unlikely”) to 5 
(“extremely likely”). Wanous, Reichers, and Hudy (1997) demonstrated 
adequate reliability for single-item measures. 
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3.2.2  Referral bonus presence 
We created a dummy variable, referral bonus presence, coded as 
1 if a referral bonus was present in the scenario to which the partici-
pant was randomly assigned and 0 if the participant was assigned the 
no-bonus condition. 
3.2.3  Referral bonus amount 
We treated the referral bonus amount variable as ordinal data and 
used dummy variables to examine its effects. The $500 referral bo-
nus was coded 1 if the participant responded to the scenario with the 
$500 referral bonus, and 0 otherwise. The $1,500 referral bonus and 
$3,500 referral bonus dummy variables were coded similarly. In our 
analyses, the no referral bonus dummy variable was the omitted (or 
reference) variable. 
3.2.4  Perceived risk in referring 
We operationalized perceived risk in referring by asking partici-
pants to indicate their agreement (1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly 
agree) with the following two statements: “I believe that referring 
someone to a job at my company is risky,” and “At my company, 
there is risk involved when referring.” Coefficient alpha for this mea-
sure was .81. 
3.2.5  Affective commitment 
We measured affective commitment with Meyer, Allen, and Smith’s 
(1993) 6-item affective organizational commitment scale. An exam-
ple item is “I would be happy to spend the rest of my career with this 
organization.” Coefficient alpha for this scale was .84 in our sample. 
3.2.6  Control variables 
We measured and assessed several covariates that we expected 
to be related to referring behavior to possibly increase the sensitivity 
of our analysis.1 Importantly, the findings presented here were robust 
to the inclusion of all control variables. However, for the sake of par-
simony and given the exploratory nature of the controls we used due 
to the dearth of studies empirically examining these relationships, we 
followed T. E. Becker’s (2005) statistical control recommendations and 
reported the results testing our hypotheses with only statistically sig-
nificant covariates. Thus, our models included the dummy variable, 
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referred to own job, coded as 1 for those participants who were re-
ferred to their job and 0 otherwise. We standardized continuous pre-
dictor variables in our analyses. 
4  Results 
We took steps to assess the degree of common method variance 
(CMV) underlying our data because our data were cross-sectional and 
self-reported. First, we performed the Harman’s single-factor test to 
examine whether a general factor explained most of the variance for 
all items in our measures of perceived risk in referring, affective com-
mitment, and likelihood of referring (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & 
Podsakoff, 2003). The results revealed two distinct factors (eigenval-
ues >1), with the first factor explaining only 42% of the variance. Im-
portantly, the items loaded on their respective latent constructs. The 
single item measuring likelihood of referring loaded on a third factor 
with an eigenvalue of .87. Finally, a more rigorous test is to control 
for an unmeasured latent method factor, in which items are specified 
to load on the method factor as well as their first-order theoretical 
factor (Johnson, Rosen, & Djurdjevic, 2011; Podsakoff, MacKenzie, & 
Podsakoff, 2012). To assess the significance of CMV, the magnitudes 
of the factor loadings of the model without the latent CMV factor are 
compared to the 95% confidence internals around the loadings of the 
model with the latent CMV factor. Specifically, if a factor loading value 
from the proposed model falls outside the confidence interval, then 
one can conclude that two values are significantly different from each 
other (Johnson et al., 2011; Stajkovic, Lee, Greenwald, Raffiee, 2015). 
All but two factor loadings fell within the confidence interval. How-
ever, it is important to caution that this test has the potential to over-
state the effects of CMV (Johnson et al., 2001). In sum, our empirical 
checks regarding CMV, in general, suggest that it is not likely of ma-
jor significance to the relationships studied here. 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics and correlations. The 
increasingly positive correlations between the three referral bonus 
amounts and likelihood of referring (rno referral bonus = −.20, p < .01; r$500 
referral bonus = −.12, p = .11; r$1,500 referral bonus = .09, p = .24; r$3,500 referral bonus = 
.17, p < .05) indicate that likelihood of referring increases as the re-
ferral bonus increases. Perceived risk in referring is negatively and 
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significantly related to likelihood of referring (r = −.26, p < .001), and 
affective commitment is also positively and significantly associated 
with likelihood of referring (r = .24, p < .001). 
To test our hypotheses, we used multiple linear regression. Table 
2 displays the results. Hypothesis 1 predicted that the presence of a 
referral bonus would increase likelihood of referring. This was sup-
ported, as the referral bonus presence coefficient was positive and 
significant (b = .60, p < .001; Model 2 in Table 2). Related to this, we 
predicted in Hypothesis 2 that larger referral bonus amounts would 
also lead to a higher likelihood of referring. We found support for this 
hypothesis (Model 3 in Table 2).2 We conducted Wald tests of coeffi-
cient equality to further assess whether pairs of referral bonus con-
ditions were significantly different from each other. The $500 referral 
bonus condition was significantly different from the $1,500 referral 
bonus condition (F(df = 1, 179) = 4.65, p = .03) and the $3,500 refer-
ral bonus condition (F(df = 1, 179) = 7.21, p = .008). However, there 
was not a significant difference between the $1,500 and $3,500 refer-
ral bonus conditions (F(df = 1, 179) = .12, p = .73). 
Our results indicated that perceived risk in referring is negatively 
related to likelihood of referring (b = −.23, p < .001; Model 2 in Table 
2), supporting Hypothesis 3. We also predicted in Hypothesis 4 that 
the negative effect of perceived risk in referring would be weaker as 
the referral bonus amount increased because larger bonuses may be 
lucrative enough for someone to risk the potential consequences of 
a bad referral. Because we treated the referral bonus as ordinal data 
with 4 amount conditions, we first conducted a Wald test assessing 
whether the joint interaction for all conditions was significant and 
found it to be statistically significant for likelihood of referring (F(df = 
3, 176) = 3.45, p = .02; Model 5 in Table 2); see Figure 2. We also used 
STATA’s margin command to examine the simple slopes of perceived 
risk in referring under each referral bonus condition and found that 
as the bonus amount increased, the effect of perceived risk in refer-
ring weakened (No Bonussimple slope = −.60, p < .001; $500 Bonussimple slope 
= −.34, p < .01; $1,500 Bonussimple slope = −.29, p < .01; $3,500 Bonussim-
ple slope = −.03, p = .75). 
Finally, we explored the effect of affective commitment on likeli-
hood of referring and the effect of the referral bonus amount on its ef-
ficacy. In support of Hypothesis 5, affective commitment was positively 
and significantly related to likelihood of referring (b = .19, p < .01; 
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Model 2 in Table 2). Finally, we found support for Hypothesis 6, which 
predicted that at high levels of affective commitment, larger bonuses 
would be less important, whereas larger bonuses would compensate 
for low levels of affective commitment. The Wald test demonstrated 
that the joint interaction for all referral bonus amount conditions was 
statistically significant for likelihood of referring (F(df = 3, 176) = 2.95, 
p = .03; Model 6 in Table 2); see Figure 3. Based on a simple slope 
analysis (No Bonussimple slope = .41, p < .01; $500 Bonussimple slope = .35, p 
< .01; $1,500 Bonussimple slope = .09, p = .44; $3,500 Bonussimple slope = .01, 
p = .93), as shown in Figure 3, larger referral bonuses become less in-
fluential at high levels of affective commitment and compensate for 
low levels of affective commitment. 
5  Discussion 
Research has provided compelling evidence that employee referrals 
yield positive outcomes for job seekers and organizations, justifying 
the popular use of referral hiring in organizations. While scholars have 
given attention to some of the psychological motivations explaining 
why employees refer, such as positive job attitudes (Bloemer, 2010; 
Van Hoye, 2013) and prosocial desires (Van Hoye, 2013), we note that 
little empirical attention has been given to these motivations. More-
over, little attention has been paid to the organizational actions that 
motivate employees to refer and the exigencies integral to their effi-
cacy. The primary purpose of our study was to examine how organi-
zations can better motivate employees to refer through the common 
practice of offering referral bonuses. Our study presents a nuanced 
understanding of two referral bonus characteristics (i.e., presence and 
amount) coupled with two individual factors that we also predict to 
relate to likelihood of referring—perceived risk in referring and affec-
tive commitment. 
First, we found support that the presence of a referral bonus leads 
to increased likelihood of referrals. We then tested the common em-
ployer assumption—and what most pay theories predict—that larger 
referral bonuses positively relate to employees’ likelihood of referring. 
While our results indicated that employees were more likely to refer 
when large ($1,500/$3,500) rather than small ($500) bonuses were 
offered, there was not a significant difference between the effects of 
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the $1,500 and $3,500 referral bonus amounts on likelihood of refer-
ring. Thus, these findings suggest that larger bonuses are more mo-
tivating, but the effect of the referral bonus amount is likely attenu-
ated at large amounts. 
Next, our findings about perceived risk in referring emphasized 
the importance of considering and minimizing perceived risk to most 
effectively motivate employees to refer. In fact, compared to the re-
ferral bonus presence effect, perceived risk in referring explained sig-
nificantly more incremental adjusted variance (5.53%) in likelihood of 
referring than the presence of a referral bonus (4.69%). The interaction 
between perceived risk in referring and referral bonus amount also 
demonstrates that larger referral bonus amounts weaken the nega-
tive effect of perceived risk in referring on likelihood of referring; and, 
at the largest bonus amount ($3,500), the effect of risk on likelihood 
of referring became nonsignificant. Thus, large financial incentives 
may completely offset the perceived risk of making a referral; how-
ever, there are other consequences for employers to consider based 
on our findings regarding affective commitment (e.g., gaining refer-
rals from less affectively committed employees). 
Finally, we argued that employees with high affective commit-
ment may be willing to refer because of their relationship with the or-
ganization. As expected, affective commitment positively influenced 
likelihood of referring. In addition, our results provide support for a 
crowding-out effect, in which the positive effects of affective commit-
ment are attenuated when the referral bonus amount increases. As 
shown in Figure 3, higher bonus amounts ($1,500 or $3,500) had little 
influence on referring likelihood at the high levels of affective com-
mitment. However, our results demonstrate that large referral bonus 
amounts can compensate for low levels of commitment. Thus, while 
a referral bonus may offset for the effect of affective commitment on 
likelihood of referring at low commitment levels, the bonus may be 
less useful for organizations that work to foster affective commitment 
to generate referrals when affective commitment is already high or 
when a large referral bonus is offered. 
5.1  Theoretical implications 
Our study is an important departure from prior research that pri-
marily concentrates on outcomes associated with referrals. We give 
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attention to the initial phase in the referral hiring process, specifically 
the period in which employees are motivated to refer individuals from 
their social networks. This approach allows us to answer calls to give 
greater attention to the referrers (Pieper, 2015) and to illuminate the-
ories on how organizational actions can lead to employee referrals 
(Van Hoye, 2013). 
We find that the referral bonus does matter in generating refer-
rals. The referral bonus as an incentive and/or the content of the in-
formation exchanged through the bonus offer encourages employ-
ees to make the referral. Increasing the referral bonus amount proved 
effective in increasing the likelihood of referring only between the 
$500 bonus amount compared to the $1,500/$3,500 bonus amounts. 
One explanation for this, from a social exchange perspective, is the 
principle of eventual reduced marginal utility (G. J. Blau, 1986). Essen-
tially, the more of a given resource an individual has, the less value 
he or she places on additional increments of the resource. We add 
to the literature the first empirical support for the proposed nega-
tive effect of perceived risk in referring on likelihood of referring. We 
theorize that the potential for perceived negative social exchanges 
exists in the referring process and may put at risk opportunities for 
the future social exchange of resources with the organization or its 
members, due to a host of ways in which the referral could turn into 
a negative experience (e.g., underperforming referral and cultural 
misfit of the referral). Increased bonus amounts do offset the nega-
tive effects of perceived risk. 
However, higher referral bonuses may lessen the need for em-
ployer reciprocity of additional resources and decrease opportunities 
for employees to demonstrate altruism and trustworthiness. These 
factors seem particularly relevant to those with higher affective com-
mitment. Our results support the idea that those with higher affective 
commitment are more likely to refer; however, at these elevated lev-
els, the referral bonus becomes less important, demonstrating the im-
portance of considering both financial and nonfinancial factors within 
the social exchange process and in subsequent referral research. Em-
ployees may attach different meanings to the exchange of particu-
laristic (e.g., affect, altruism) versus nonparticularistic (e.g., money) 
resources with the former being more specific to the exchange part-
ner and relevant to trust building (Molm et al., 2000). These findings 
likely would have theoretical implications for models of the referring 
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process and practical implications for employers when designing and 
improving their employee referral program. The various forms of so-
cial exchange (direct negotiated versus direct reciprocal and general-
ized exchanges) may have differential effects on subsequent behav-
ior and on anticipated future social exchanges. Future research can 
disentangle the various forms of social exchange present in the re-
ferring process. 
5.2  Practical implications 
Because organizations often want to leverage their employees’ social 
networks in the hiring process to reduce recruitment costs and facili-
tate better hire matches, referral bonuses are one tool to do so. A key 
takeaway from our study is that the presence of a referral bonus is im-
portant. Managers who want to increase employee referrals should, 
at a minimum, offer a referral bonus. The amount offered depends 
on the needs of the organization and the common reaction of spend-
ing more money on something to further motivate may not be ideal 
when it comes to best managing one’s referral program. Our finding 
that the $3,500 referral bonus did not result in an increased referring 
likelihood compared to the $1,500 referral bonus suggests that the 
referral bonus effect may attenuate as the amount increases. Further-
more, a key premise of work motivation theories is that different peo-
ple are motivated by different things (Kanfer, Frese, & Johnson, 2017). 
Thus, the referral bonus’s valence may differ for employees who are 
more (or less) affectively committed to the organization and for risk-
averse employees. Employers should therefore be cognizant of such 
individual factors when offering referral bonuses. 
Because existing evidence demonstrates that the quality of the re-
ferral is often like the quality of the referrer (e.g., Pieper, 2015), it is im-
portant for employers to consider what type of rewards may generate 
the referrals they desire. For example, if the firm has many open posi-
tions to be filled (e.g., a call center with a high turnover rate), award-
ing larger referral bonuses would be advantageous because they mo-
tivate referrals even from employees with lower affective commitment, 
a group that may make up a sizable portion of a high-turnover firm’s 
employee base. However, for organizations with more particular hir-
ing needs, increasing referral bonus amounts may not be the best 
approach. Higher referral bonus amounts for affectively committed 
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employees could even be perceived as limiting and potentially deval-
uing the types of resources the employee wishes to exchange with the 
organization (e.g., love, affect, altruism, trust). Employers attempting 
to gain referrals from affectively committed employees should con-
sider the particularism of the resource the employee exchanges with 
the organization and attempt to also match that particularism in ex-
change for referrals. While the best way to decide what resource to 
exchange would be to ask the referrer(s), other examples of ways to 
demonstrate appreciation that may increase referral motivation of af-
fectively committed employees include a dinner with the CEO, a thank-
you lunch with one’s manager, special recognition at a company event, 
and so forth. Because those who are affectively committed to the or-
ganization tend to emotionally identify with the organization’s values 
and goals, giving them the opportunity to provide input to individu-
als leading said values and goals or providing special recognition may 
exchange the more particularistic resources that they value. 
In addition to offering a referral bonus, another means for organi-
zations to generate referrals is to mitigate perceived risk in referring. 
One possible tactic to help manage perceptions of risk could be to in-
form employees about the characteristics of a “good” hire. Some or-
ganizations or positions may mainly focus on values and work ethic, 
while others require specific schooling and experience. Organizations 
could focus their communication strategies with employees in terms 
of what types of individuals the organization seeks. An organization 
may consider the following: whether it provides easy real-time em-
ployee access to job-posting information and whether it adequately 
educates employees on the referral process (e.g., the organization’s 
point of contact for employee referrals, whether the point of contact 
differs for each position, and what is typical in the application and in-
terview process). A lack of knowledge about the process may make 
the referrer doubt his or her abilities to manage the ins and outs of 
making a referral, both on the organization side and in responding 
to questions from the referral. Any self-doubt an employee may feel 
about his or her abilities to handle the referral process will likely lead 
to higher perceived risk in making the referral and thus fewer referrals. 
Alternative referring routes could also be made available to employ-
ees, such as letting employees make referrals anonymously through 
the human resources department so that the bonus could still be 
awarded but no other responsibilities or subsequent expectations of 
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future social exchanges would be implied. More explicitly, employers 
could inform employees that there are no consequences to them if 
they do happen to refer a bad match. 
5.3  Limitations and future research 
Our research has several limitations. First, our desire to manipulate 
the referral bonus amount was best facilitated using a scenario in-
stead of surveying employees of a real-life company seeking refer-
rals. However, we incorporated several design aspects to potentially 
offset this limitation: We used currently employed individuals work-
ing full-time, instructed participants to consider their own job when 
responding to the survey, and asked participants if they knew some-
one to refer and, if so, to provide that person’s name. To enhance re-
alism, our study design populated that person’s name into subsequent 
questions. Examining referral bonus effects in real organizational set-
tings is needed in future research. 
As we discussed earlier, another limitation was that the data were 
cross-sectional and self-reported, possibly raising the concern of com-
mon method variance. While there is no theoretical rationale to ex-
pect spurious interaction effects due to CMV (Evans, 1985; Schmitt, 
1994) and the results of our tests to assess the degree of CMV affect-
ing our relationships suggest it is not a significant factor biasing our 
findings, future scholars should collect longitudinal and multisource 
data to further minimize this concern. Additionally, we also took steps 
to minimize it through the study’s design. For example, we varied the 
response scale across the survey, ensured participants that there were 
no right or wrong answers, and used midpoints in scales (Podsakoff et 
al., 2003). Other recommendations were not practical here (e.g., ob-
taining measures by different individuals or sources was not desired) 
because our main constructs assessed individual perceptions of risk 
and willingness to refer. 
We conceptualized about the various forms of social exchange (di-
rect negotiated exchange versus direct reciprocal and generalized ex-
changes) that referring may demonstrate. However, we did not em-
pirically disentangle employee perceptions of reciprocity in making 
referrals or the extent to which they valued the immediate exchange 
opportunity (the referral bonus) and probable future exchange op-
portunities resulting from referring. Such factors may moderate some 
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of the findings reported here. Future research can build on our work 
to disentangle the various forms of social exchange present in the re-
ferring process. 
Finally, additional research should further examine how large re-
ferral bonuses affect outcomes associated with referral hiring (e.g., 
referral quality, performance, and tenure). Our focus on the referrer 
also can be expanded to unpack the underlying theoretical mecha-
nisms explaining why referred hires tend to perform better and stay 
longer. Referrer motivations and behaviors both pre- and post-refer-
ral hire, such as prescreening candidates and providing realistic in-
formation about the job and organization to the potential referral, as 
well as on-the-job mentorship, may play a role. In addition, more re-
search attention on risk in referring is warranted by our findings. For 
example, individual differences in risk propensity (Meertens & Lion, 
2008; Nicholson, Soane, Fenton-O’Creevy, & Willman, 2005) may play 
a role in likelihood of referring. Perceptions of risk could be further un-
packed. We kept our measure as general as possible to capture mul-
tiple forms of risk. Separating the effects of the various risks that in-
dividuals perceive when referring may be beneficial, so organizations 
can further target and reduce perceived risk in referring. 
6  Conclusion 
The organizational practice of using referral bonuses to motivate em-
ployees to refer is prevalent, and many employers assume that offer-
ing a referral bonus, or a larger one, will lead to more referrals. Our 
findings generally support these assumptions, yet we also provide in-
sight into nuances regarding perceived risk in referring and affective 
commitment. Our findings offer theoretical and practical evidence that 
the characteristics of the referral bonus, management of perceived risk 
in referring, and affective commitment play key roles in motivating 
employees to refer. Given the robust evidence that employee job re-
ferrals result in positive organizational and job seeker outcomes, fo-
cused research on employee motivations to refer seems a logical and 
needed extension. 
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Notes 
1. We considered variables such as reputation importance (i.e., the degree to which 
individuals valued their reputation in the workplace); referred to own job (i.e., 
whether the person was referred to his/her job); prior referrer (i.e., whether 
the participant had referred a candidate to their employer in the past); tenure 
benchmark included in scenario (1 = yes, 0 = no); perceived difficulty in hiring 
(i.e., a participant’s perception of the difficulty in hiring a candidate for a job 
similar to his/her own); and a number of covariates relevant to a fulltime work-
ing sample that we thought may affect our results (e.g., age, tenure, salary, and 
education). In analyses not shown here but available from the first author, we 
examined the influence of these covariates on likelihood of referring, and only 
one (i.e., referred to own job) accounted for significant variation in likelihood 
of referring, which we retained in the models we present here. Inclusion of all 
covariates slightly weakened the coefficients of our independent variables but 
did not change the direction or significance of our findings. 
2. In results not shown here, but available upon request, we examined the results 
when the referral bonus amount variable was treated as a continuous measure. 
We found a significant, positive relationship between referral bonus amount and 
likelihood of referring. Interaction effects with referral bonus amount treated 
as continuous were also like those for the referral bonus amount tested with 
dummy variables.  
Figure 1. Relationships tested  
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Figure 2. Interaction effect of perceived risk in referring and referral bonus 
amount on the likelihood of referring  
Figure 3. Interaction effect of affective commitment and referral bonus amount 
on the likelihood of referring  
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics and correlations—likelihood of referring
Variable  Mean  SD  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9
1   Likelihood of referring  4.46  .86
2   Referred to own job  .25  .44  .17
3   Perceived risk in referring  2.37  1.04  –.26  .10
4   Affective commitment  3.57  .95  .24  .03  –.17
5   Referral bonus presence  .88  .33  .20  .07  .03  –.14
6   No referral bonus  .12  .33  –.20  –.07  –.03  .14  –1.00
7   $500 referral bonus  .30  .46  –.12  .00  –.07  –.05  .25  –.25
8   $1,500 referral bonus  .25  .43  .09  –.08  .04  –.01  .22  –.22  –.38
9   $3,500 referral bonus  .33  .47  .17  .12  .06  –.04  .26  –.26  –.46  –.40
N = 186. Variable statistics reported in their unstandardized metric.  
Correlations greater than .15 are significant at p = .05.  
Two-tailed tests reported.
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Table 2. Likelihood of referring regressed on referral bonus characteristics, perceived risk in referring, and affective 
commitment
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5
Intercept  4.37***  3.82***  3.82***  3.76***  3.74***
 (.07)  (.17)  (.16)  (.16)  (.17)
Referred to own job  .33*  .33*  .32*  .31*  .34*
 0.14)  (.13)  (.13)  (.13)  (.13)
Perceived risk in referring   –.22***  –.23***  –.60***  –.20***
  (.06)  (.06)  (.18)  (.06)
Affective commitment   .19**  .19**  .15**  .41**
  (.06)  (.06)  (.06)  (.15)
Referral bonus presence   .60***
  (.18)
No referral bonus    —  —  —
(reference condition)
$500 referral bonus    .36†  .40*  .46*
   (.19)  (.19)  (.20)
$1,500 referral bonus    .69***  .75***  .77***
   (.20)  (.20)  (.20)
$3,500 referral bonus    .75***  .82***  .81***
   (.19)  (.19)  (.20)
No referral bonus X     —
Perceived risk in referring
$500 bonus X     .26
Perceived risk in referring     (.21)
$1,500 bonus X     .31
Perceived risk in referring     (.21)
$3,500 bonus X     .58**
Perceived risk in referring     (.20)
No referral bonus X      —
Affective commitment
$500 Bonus X      –.06
Affective commitment      (.18)
$1,500 bonus X      –.31†
Affective commitment      (.19)
$3,500 bonus X      –.40*
Affective commitment      (.18)
N  186  186  186  186  186
Df  1  4  6  9  9
R2adjusted  .02  .17  .20  .23  .23
Continuous independent variables are standardized.  
Standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests reported.
† p < .10 ; * p < .05 ; ** p < .01 ; *** p < .001
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